Jean-Paul Sartre believed that consciousness entails self-consciousness, or, even more strongly, that consciousness is self-consciousness. As Kathleen Wider puts it in her terrific book The Bodily Nature of Consciousness: Sartre and Contemporary Philosophy of Mind, ‘all consciousness is, by its very nature, self-consciousness.’ I share this view with Sartre and have elsewhere argued for it at length. My overall aim in this paper is to examine Sartre's theory of consciousness against the background of the so-called (...) ‘higher-order thought theory of consciousness’ which, in turn, will shed light on the structure of conscious mental states as well as on Sartre's theory of consciousness and reflection. Another goal of this paper is, following Wider, to show how Sartre's views can be understood from a contemporary analytic perspective. Sartre's theory of consciousness is often confusing to the so-called ‘analytic Anglo-American’ tradition, but I attempt to show how this obstacle can be overcome against the backdrop of a specific contemporary theory of consciousness. (shrink)

Peter Abelard (1079–1142 ce) was the most wide‐ranging philosopher of the twelfth century. He quickly established himself as a leading teacher of logic in and near Paris shortly after 1100. After his affair with Heloise, and his subsequent castration, Abelard became a monk, but he returned to teaching in the Paris schools until 1140, when his work was condemned by a Church Council at Sens. His logical writings were based around discussion of the “Old Logic”: Porphyry's Isagoge, aristotle'S Categories and (...) On Interpretation and boethius'S textbook on topical inference. They comprise a freestanding Dialectica (“Logic”; probably c.1116), a set of commentaries (known as the Logica [Ingredientibus], c. 1119) and a later (c. 1125) commentary on the Isagoge (Logica Nostrorum Petititoni Sociorum or Glossulae). In a work Abelard called his Theologia, issued in three main versions (between 1120 and c.1134), he attempted a logical analysis of trinitarian relations and explored the philosophical problems surrounding God's claims to omnipotence and omniscience. The Collationes (“Debates,” also known as “Dialogue between a Christian, a Philosopher and a Jew”; probably c.1130) present a rational investigation into the nature of the highest good, in which the Christian and the Philosopher (who seems to be modeled on a philosopher of pagan antiquity) are remarkably in agreement. The unfinished Scito teipsum (“Know thyself,” also known as the “Ethics”; c.1138) analyses moral action. (shrink)

ABSTRACT This essay explores the possibility for a phenomenology of Christian vocational calling through conversation with Jean-Paul Sartre’s existential-ontology. By demonstrating how Sartre’s account of nothingness comports with a Rahnerian understanding of God as absolute mystery and how Sartre’s account of bad faith further opens up an understanding of ontological self-identity as a turn away from God, we can establish a phenomenology of Christian vocation as one’s owning each finite situation in terms of its divinely available (...) possibilities rather than simply its given conditions. Divine call thus occurs where one’s possibilities for boundless becoming are freely recognized in any situation and are further apprehended in light of the character of God to become the possibilities for the freedom and calling of others. (shrink)

Volume 7 in Forschungen zur Pädagogik und Anthropologie. The emphasis on the human body as a key to an understanding of man and the world has been one of the defining characteristics of contemporary existentialism. The role of the human body as it is discussed by the two major French "Existentialists," Jean-Paul Sartre and Maurice Merleau-Ponty, is discussed by Willi Maier in relation to the ethical and social views of the philosophy of each, and implications for the social (...) sciences are drawn by contrasting their descriptions of human corporeality. Well-founded yet sympathetic observations are made about the respective importance of the roles of human corporeality such that the position of Merleau-Ponty is seen not only as the more encompassing but also the more fruitful and less-problematic for adoption by social scientists as a solution to certain difficulties which plague them. This is a carefully critical yet empathetic and highly suggestive account of what may be considered the most fruitful contribution of these phenomenologists to philosophy and the "human" disciplines in general.—J. E. B. (shrink)

In the end of the 1960s France witnessed the response of the younger generation of philosophers to the leftist ideologies of 1968, as well as to the "intellectual models" of that time: Sartre, Lévi-Strauss, Lacan etc. It was from this response that the so called "new philosophy" raised. Among them also B.-H. Lévy, who later, as a mature philosopher , in spite of having suppressed his model J.-P. Sartre returned to him in his remarkable biography. The question than (...) is: Which Sartre - then there were more than one Sartre: Sartre as the author of Nausea is not identical with Sartre as a follower of Stalinism - and how could he substantiate the whole century, which was a century of seething of ideas, events mostly tragic, challenges, defeats, which all are constitutive of our modernity? (shrink)

Using the same technique employed in The Tragic Finale, Desan now has written an admirable guide to Sartre's Critique de la Raison Dialectique. Desan begins by tracing Sartre's development from the time of L'Etre et le Néant with careful attention to the heated controversies that appeared in Les Temps Modernes. This provides the context for a lucid and fair explication of the main argument of the Critique. Throughout, Desan has maintained a judicious balance between exposition, explication, and criticism. (...) The study can not replace the reading of the original work, but there is no doubt that it serves as an excellent guide through the labyrinth of Sartre's intricate and turgid dialectic.—R. J. B. (shrink)

In chapter one I cover the basic concepts developed in Being and Nothingness, notable those of "temporality," "negation," "anguish" and "bad faith." In chapter two I move from the individual as the center of free action, to the individual in relation to the Other. In chapter three I attempt to unify the perspectives in the first two chapter and present a theory of action. In chapter four I introduce the reader to the Critique and establish its thematic links with Being (...) and Nothingness. In chapter five I analyze the ramifications of the concept of the practico-inert, which, for Sartre, is inseparable from human sociality. In chapter six I deal with the concept of organization, which refers to the contradictions within the social group as it moves into advanced stages of social integration. In chapter seven I cover the concepts of power and authority. Chapter eight deals with the idea of dialectical humanism and highlights essential concepts in the work by way of concluding it. --Introduction. (shrink)

La "Grande Morale," progettata da J.-P. Sartre tra il 1947 e il 1949 come naturale completamento della filosofia esistenzialista esposta ne L'essere e il nulla e L'esistenzialismo e un umanismo, non e mai stata pubblicata: abbandonata e ripresa piu volte nei successivi vent'anni, ha finito per costituire un serbatoio di annotazioni e di riflessioni sempre dirottate altrove, una specie di fantasma letterario, onnipresente, ma pronto a dileguarsi ogni volta che sembrava avere raggiunto una forma consistente. Sappiamo oggi, grazie alla (...) pubblicazione dei molti inediti sartriani, che la riflessione sulla morale ha accompagnato tutti gli snodi fondamentali del pensiero di Sartre, dai cosiddetti scritti giovanili alle opere della maturita, dalla svolta "dialettica" sino all'ultima discussa intervista, rilasciata poco prima della scomparsa. Gli studi qui riuniti hanno nei Quaderni per una morale (1947-48) il loro centro di gravita e di maggiore interesse. Di questo tentativo abortito di scrivere una "Morale" essi provano a disegnare la parabola, dalle origini remote nei Taccuini della strana guerra (1939) sino al Santo Genet commediante e martire (1952), che ne sancisce l'abbandono. Senza disdegnare qualche incursione nell'estetica sartriana, poiche della "morale introvabile" non c'e in realta testo che non rechi qualche traccia.". (shrink)

A novel introduction to Jean-Paul Sartre’s existentialist phenomenology. Draws parallels between Sartre’s work and the work of Wittgenstein Stresses continuities rather than conflict between Sartre and Merleau-Ponty, and between Sartre and post-structuralist/post-modernist thinkers, thus corroborating ‘new Sartre’ readings Exhibits the influence of Gestalt psychology in Sartre’s descriptions of the life-world Forms part of the _Blackwell Great Minds_ series, which outlines the views of the great western thinkers and captures the relevance of these figures (...) to the way we think and live today. (shrink)

This chapter contains sections titled: Introduction Background: Phenomenology and Existential Philosophy Sartre's Account of Action Some Wider Background Assessment: Internal Relations Assessment: Human Beings and the Human World References.

The purpose of the following article is to juxtapose and compare the concept of shame as seen by two contemporary French philosophers, Jean Paul Sartre and Emmanuel Levinas. The fundamental problem that is posed in this article concerns the role and significance of the impact of shame on the formation of human subjectivity. For both J.P. Sartre and E. Levinas, the subject attempts to bear the burden of being in a heroic way and the experience of shame (...) proves to be an important experience in this process. Is it an ontological or ethical experience? Or perhaps metaphysical? For both J.P. Sartre and E. Levinas, shame is a relational experience, i.e., it occurs in relation to You. But does this Other have to come to me from outside? In Sartre’s case, shame appears in the experience of the gaze of the Other, and it is a traumatic experience. The Other interferes with my freedom and challenges me as a subject. The experience of shame makes me aware of my subjugation by the Other. In Levinas, the experience of shame comes originally from within myself. The shame of my own existence demands justification. I can be ashamed in relation to myself. I can be a menace of myself. I don’t need the presence of another human being for this. What unites and what separates the two philosophers in interpreting the experience of shame for human subjectivity? (shrink)

The purpose of the following article is to juxtapose and compare the concept of shame as seen by two contemporary French philosophers, Jean Paul Sartre and Emmanuel Levinas. The fundamental problem that is posed in this article concerns the role and significance of the impact of shame on the formation of human subjectivity. For both J.P. Sartre and E. Levinas, the subject attempts to bear the burden of being in a heroic way and the experience of shame (...) proves to be an important experience in this process. Is it an ontological or ethical experience? Or perhaps metaphysical? For both J.P. Sartre and E. Levinas, shame is a relational experience, i.e., it occurs in relation to You. But does this Other have to come to me from outside? In Sartre’s case, shame appears in the experience of the gaze of the Other, and it is a traumatic experience. The Other interferes with my freedom and challenges me as a subject. The experience of shame makes me aware of my subjugation by the Other. In Levinas, the experience of shame comes originally from within myself. The shame of my own existence demands justification. I can be ashamed in relation to myself. I can be a menace of myself. I don’t need the presence of another human being for this. What unites and what separates the two philosophers in interpreting the experience of shame for human subjectivity? (shrink)

Sartre's Philosophy of Social Existence is a critical interpretation of Jean-Paul Sartre's phenomenology of social existence and the dynamics of group-formation. It seeks to trade the foreshadowing of a theory of individual action in the practical field of social existence in Being and Nothingness and sees a continuity between this work and Sartre's Critique of Rational Dialectic (1960). The movement in Sartre's thought from the abstract freedom of consciousness to concrete freedom and individual praxis is (...) illuminated in relation to his description of a complex social dialectic. It is shown that as Sartre develops an account of social group-formation he admits determinations and necessities that undermine his attempt to preserve the idea of free individual praxis. (shrink)

RESUMEN A partir del examen de la noción de dialéctica ofrecida por Jean-Paul Sartre en “Cuestiones de método”, se identifican tres características propias de dicha noción presentes en la dialéctica de Hegel: el papel de la reflexión, la negatividad y la relación entre la dialéctica y la subjetividad. ABSTRACT On the basis of the analysis of the notion of dialectics set forth by Jean-Paul Sartre in “Search for a Method”, the article identifies three characteristics of said (...) notion that were already present in Hegel’s dialectics: the role of reflection, negativity, and the relation between dialectics and subjectivity. (shrink)

Douglas Harding developed a unique first-person experimental approach for investigating consciousness that is still relatively unknown in academia. In this paper, I present a critical dialogue between Harding, Sartre and Merleau-Ponty on the phenomenology of the body and intersubjectivity. Like Sartre and Merleau-Ponty, Harding observes that from the first-person perspective, I cannot see my own head. He points out that visually speaking nothing gets in the way of others. I am radically open to others and the world. Neither (...) does my somatic experience establish a boundary between me and the world. Rather to experience these sensations as part of a bounded, shaped thing (a body), already involves bringing in the perspectives of others. The reader is guided through a series of Harding’s first-person experiments to test these phenomenological claims for themselves. For Sartre, the other’s subjectivity is known through The Look, which makes me into a mere object for them. Merleau-Ponty criticised Sartre for making intersubjective relations primarily ones of conflict. Rather he held that the intentionality of my body is primordially interconnected with that of others’ bodies. We are already situated in a shared social world. For Harding, like Sartre, my consciousness is a form of nothingness; however, in contrast to Sartre, it does not negate the world, but is absolutely united with it. Confrontation is a delusion that comes from imagining that I am behind a face. Rather in lived personal relationships, I become the other. I conclude by arguing that for Harding all self-awareness is a form of other-awareness, and vice versa. (shrink)

'Alors, c'est la cérémonie des adieux?' m'a dit Sartre, comme nous nous quittions pour un mois, au début de l'été. J'ai pressenti le sens que devaient prendre un jour ces mots. La cérémonie a duré dix ans : ce sont ces dix années que je raconte dans ce livre.

O texto em questão apresenta o primeiro esboço de uma pesquisa mais ampla acerca da “Transcendência do Ego”, de J.-P. Sartre. Seu desenvolvimento, ora apresentado, pretende articular o sentido mais geral da fenomenologia de Husserlcom a aclimatação, algo abruta, feita por Sartre, no referido texto, da fenomenologia husserliana. Para isso, há que se levar em conta, parece-nos, tanto os problemas propriamente sartreanos que orientam seus interesses teóricos e a dita aclimatação, quanto os limites propriamente husserlianos para tal.

Thoughts of mortality sometimes bring on a crisis in confidence in the meaning in one's life. One expression of this collapse is the midlife crisis. In a recent article, Kieran Setiya argues that if one can value activities as opposed to accomplishments as the primary goods in one's life then one might avoid the midlife crisis. I argue that Setiya's advice, rather than safeguarding the meaning in one's life, substitutes for it something else, a kind of happiness. I use Susan (...) Wolf's concept of meaning in order to make this case. Wolf has not written much about the importance of death, but I argue that her account of meaning shares essential features with the theories developed by Jean-Paul Sartre and Martin Heidegger. Sartre argues that death is an unqualified harm, while Heidegger argues that there is meaning in life only because we are mortal. I conclude by showing how Heidegger's theory of mortality underwrites accounts of meaning like those found in Wolf. (shrink)